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PARTIES AND TRANSACTIONS COVERED BY
CONSUMER-CREDIT LEGISLATION
(NEILINEIL LITTLEFIELD*
An examination of the parties and transactions which ought to
be covered by consumer-credit legislation must indicate at the outset
that there are a number of ways to limit such coverage. For example,
coverage can be limited to sales of consumer goods,' or even sales of
particular goods, such as automobiles. 2 It can also be limited to pro-
tection of specific parties, e.g., consumers. As will become evident,
however, it is somewhat difficult to discuss coverage of parties and of
transactions separately. As a context for discussion, frequent reference
will be made in this article to the preliminary drafts of the proposed
Uniform Consumer Credit Code. 3
There are many ways to classify the various types of transactions
involving consumer credit, but any descriptive scheme should bear a
reasonable relationship to the objectives of the legislation for which
the classification is designed. Though it is not the purpose of this
article to discuss the substantive provisions which consumer-credit
legislation should include, it is necessary to recognize the customary
goals of such legislation. Therefore, the basic assumption is made that
there is a need to regulate credit transactions involving the consumer,
so that credit agencies will responsibly perform their necessary
function. The need for such regulation undoubtedly flows from the
inappropriateness of the normal rules of contract, commercial, and
property law to the consumer-credit transaction.
I. SALES VS. LOANS: THE TIME-PRICE DIFFERENTIAL
An underlying problem in considering the question of coverage
of consumer-credit legislation is the extent to which credit sales and
loans should be treated differently. No statute yet enacted has treated
credit sales and loans as two sides of the same coin. There is an
historical reason for this. Initially, the need for statutory reform
• B.S., University of Maine, 1953; LL.B., Boston University, 1957; LL.M., Uni-
versity of Michigan, 1959; S.J.D. University of Michigan, 1961; Professor of Law, Uni-
versity of Connecticut; Visiting Professor of Law, Indiana University.
1 See U.C.C. § 9-1090), which defines "consumer goods" as those goods "used
or bought for use primarily for personal, family or household purposes."
2 A number of states have retail installment sales legislation which applies only to
motor vehicles—some in connection with an act applying to all goods and some not. See
Curran, Trends in Consumer Credit Legislation 254-55 (Chart 11) (1965).
3 The . research for the drafting of the Uniform Consumer Credit Code has been
the responsibility of the Special Committee on Retail Installment Sales, Consumer Credit,
Small Loans and Usury of the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State
Laws. The chairman is Alfred A. Buerger, Esq. The name of the Special Committee sug-
gests that it was given the widest latitude in coverage.
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developed as a result of abuses in the so-called "small loan" business.
The Russell Sage Foundation responded by sponsoring a model small
loan act which applied only to creditors who made direct loans.' This
act was passed in a number of states long before credit sales trans-
actions began to attract attention.' Later, a second series of enact-
ments was directed at credit sales.
The legal distinction between a loan and a credit sale was also
nurtured by the judiciary. Because of the development of credit sales,
the restrictive usury laws had to be relaxed to assure the creditor a
fair return on his money. The courts recognized that credit sales had
their place in the American economy, and agreed that a merchant could
sell goods on credit, free of the usury restrictions, if the merchant
sold for a "credit price" as opposed to a "cash price." Although an
economist might argue that the difference represented a charge for the
use of the purchase price during the term of the contract, and was
therefore interest, the courts held that the difference was a "time-
price differential," and thus was not interest.'
It would seem that the decision to draft a uniform consumer-
credit code might present an opportunity to reevaluate the theory of
a time-price differential and to eliminate it if it is in fact based upon a
meaningless distinction. In other words, if small loans and retail
installment sales are to be regulated similarly in a uniform act, it
would be sensible to consider treating them as part of the same
functional concept. It appears, however, that the Credit Code will
retain the traditional distinction: A comment to the First Tentative
Draft states that "the Special Committee firmly believes that this
doctrine is sound and has preserved it in this Code."'
At this point, it should be noted that neither the First nor Second
Draft of the Credit Code statutorily affirms the time-price differential.
There is no actual language which states that the courts must treat a
retail installment sales transaction and a consumer loan differently.
However, there is one feature of the act which does affirm the
dichotomy—the definition and scope of a "consumer credit trans-
action." The Special Committee could have elected to draft an act
which applied generally to "consumer credit transactions" with special
4 This act may be found in Barrett, Compilation of Consumer Finance Laws 675
(1952). See generally Robinson & Nugent, Regulation of the Small Loan Business 96-137
(1935).
5 See id. at 134, listing eighteen jurisdictions which enacted various versions of the
Uniform Small Loan Law between 1917 and 1934.
6 See Consumer Credit Symposium, 55 NIA/. U.L. Rev. 301, 303-04 (1960).
7 Credit Code § 1.201(21), comment (Tent. Draft No. 1, 1966). This comment
follows the definition of "loan," which includes the purely gratuitous statement: "The
credit sale of goods or services does not involve a loan of money to the buyer either
by the seller or by a transferee of the debt arising from the sale."
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sections where separate treatment was necessary; instead, they
divided the act into individual parts dealing with "consumer credit
sales"' and "consumer loans,"' designating both as within the concept
of "consumer credit transaction.""
The validity of the time-price-differential doctrine has been
challenged by commentators in the past. One writer, for example, has
stated:
Little support is afforded by underlying economic realities
for drawing a fine legal distinction between interest on a loan
and interest on an instalment sale. From an economic point of
view, the credit sale and the loan are alike in nature. In each,
one party is seeking to gain present goods in return for a
promise to pay in future goods."
Since this distinction is at best a difficult one to defend, is there a
reason for the position taken by the Special Committee on this
important policy consideration? Simply because the explanation may
lie in the bailiwick of "practical politics" should not bar a discussion
of it here.
At first glance, it would seem that if the Credit Code contained
reasonable maximum rates and certain acceptable disclosure pro-
visions for both credit sales and consumer loans, there would be no
need for the time-price-differential doctrine. It would seem further
that the credit industry itself would have little reason for objection.
The enactment of uniform legislation, however, is not automatic.
Perhaps industry opposition to abrogation of the doctrine is based
upon a real fear of what would happen in the interim between
promulgation of the act and its adoption by all jurisdictions. Suppose
the Code did abrogate the doctrine. The promulgation of the act
would itself stand as respectable authority for the proposition that
the distinction upon which the doctrine is based is at best a mere
fiction and no longer necessary. There would then be the danger that
a court in a jurisdiction which had not yet enacted the Credit Code
would be persuaded to abandon the doctrine. Without the Credit
Code or some similar legislation, elimination of the time-price
8 " 'Consumer credit sale' means a consumer credit transaction in which the creditor
sells goods or services." Credit Code § 1.204 (Tent. Draft No. I, 1966). See Credit Code
§ 2.102(1) (Tent. Draft No. 2, 1967).
9 " 'Consumer loan' means a consumer credit transaction in which the creditor loans
or makes a firm commitment to loan money." Credit Code § 1.203 (Tent. Draft No. 1,
1966). See Credit Code § 3.102(2) (Tent. Draft No. 2, 1967).
to The structure of the First and Second Tentative Drafts indicates the choice
made by the drafters, since "Sales" and "Loans" are covered by separate articles. These
articles have parallel treatment of, for example, maximum charges, deferral charges,
delinquency charges, and limitations on assignment of earnings.
1 1 Berger, Usury in Instalment Sales, 2 Law & Contemp. Prob. 148, 153 (1935).
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differential would drop the retail installment credit industry into the
treacherous waters of the usury laws. 12
Since there is the possibility of involvement with the usury laws,
it is reasonable to inquire what damage would be done or what abuses
left uncured by retaining the concept of time-price differential. This
inquiry presumes, of course, that there is no objection to prolonging
a fiction for purposes of "practical politics" if the continuation is
harmless. Contemporary criticism of the time-price differential focuses
upon the exorbitant rates and lack of adequate disclosure in many
retail installment credit sales. This criticism should be stifled if the
Credit Code prescribes maximum rates and disclosure requirements
which are similar for both sales and loans. There may, however, be
other abuses of consumer credit which are made possible by the
decision to retain the dichotomy between sales and loans.
There is at least one problem the resolution of which, arguably, is
made more difficult because of the preservation of the distinction
between sales and loans. This problem concerns the availability of
consumer defenses against a financing agency. Generally, the pur-
chaser of a negotiable instrument takes the instrument free and clear
of any defenses which may exist between the obligor and the payee if
the purchaser takes without notice of such defenses.' 3
 In the consumer-
credit situation, therefore, the finance company that purchases con-
sumer negotiable paper" without knowledge of valid defenses can
enforce the promise to pay. Mere knowledge that the negotiable
instrument is issued pursuant to a consumer sale is not notice of a
consumer defense.' 3
A result insulating finance companies from consumer defenses
has been avoided by some courts when there has been a sufficiently
close connection between the retailer and the financing agency."'
That is, when the finance company has supplied forms, rates, and
credit check, when it has agreed in advance to take the retailer's
consumer paper, and when it has a continuing relationship with the
retailer, the courts have been willing to find, on one of a number of
12 See, e.g., Hare v. General Contract Purchase Corp., 220 Ark. 601, 249 S.W.2d
973 (1952), where the Supreme Court of Arkansas disapproved of the time-price
differential, and required a creditor to prove as an issue of fact that his so-called "credit
price" was not employed as a cloak for usury.
13 U.C.C. II 3-302(1), -305(2).
14 Negotiability is based on form only. See U.C.C. § 3-104(1).
13 See U.C.C. § 3-304(4) (b).
10 See, e.g., Commercial Credit Co. v. Childs, 199 Ark. 1073, 137 S.W.2d 260
(1940); Mutual Fin. Co. v. Martin, 63 So. 2d 649 (Fla. 1953); Norman v. World
Wide Distribs., Inc., 202 Pa. Super. 53, 195 A.2d 115 (1963). See generally Littlefield,
Good Faith Purchase of Consumer Paper: The Failure of the Subjective Test, 39 So.
Cal. L. Rev. 48 (1966).
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theories," that the financing agency is insufficiently insulated from
the execution of the negotiable instrument to claim the status of a
good-faith purchaser. The purpose, of course, is to preserve consumer
defenses in situations where the consumer has little reason to expect
that his obligation to pay has been separated from the retailer's duty
to supply satisfactory goods.'
This judicial trend is acknowledged in the First and Second
Tentative Drafts of the Credit Code, which provide that in a con-
sumer-credit sale, the use of a negotiable instrument is forbidden. 19
The question now focuses on the wisdom of applying this prohibition
to consumer loans. To answer this question, some of the paperwork
behind consumer-credit transactions must be examined.
In a consumer loan, as opposed to a consumer-credit sale, the
prevailing rule is that the obligation to pay, evidenced by a negotiable
or nonnegotiable note, cannot be conditioned upon any independent
obligation which a third party may owe to the borrower as a result of
any transaction involving the borrowed money. That is, the factual
situation constituting a loan of money to be used for the purchase of
consumer goods is legally distinguishable from the factual situation
of a credit purchase of goods followed by an assignment of the
obligation to pay to a financing agency. This may seem to support the
dichotomy between a sale and a loan, but let us examine three fact
situations involving a consumer, a retailer, and a financing agency.
The first fact situation, designated type A, occurs when a con-
sumer purchases on credit from a retail merchant. Typically, the
retailer will have the consumer execute an instrument evidencing a
monetary obligation and often an instrument giving the retailer a
security interest in the subject matter of the sale. The documents
executed by the consumer are generally termed "chattel paper'''' or
"consumer paper."' This consumer paper is customarily sold or
discounted by the retailer to a financing agency.
In the second transaction, type B, the consumer begins by going
to the financing agency and asking to borrow money for consumer
purchasing. The agency will have the consumer execute a promissory
17 See id. at 67-74.
18 See generally the excellent treatment in Shuchman, Consumer Credit by Adhesion
Contracts, 35 Temp. L.Q. 125, 281 (1962). Note particularly the discussion of the expec-
tations of the unknowledgeable consumer. Id. at 286-89.
19 Credit Code § 6.101 (Tent. Draft No. 1, 1966) ; Credit Code § 2.403 (Tent.
Draft No. 2, 1967). In addition, the next section in each draft denies a transferee the
benefit of clauses which waive claims and defenses of the debtor as against the seller.
20 "Chattel paper" is defined in § 9-105(1)(6) of the U.C.C. as "a writing or
writings which evidence both a monetary obligation and a security interest in or a lease
of specific goods."
21 "Consumer paper" is simply a term to describe chattel paper executed by a
consumer.
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note, usually negotiable, and often will take a security interest in
either the consumer's property or his wages. Then the consumer
presumably shops with cash for what he wants.
Transaction type C is a combination of the two prior situations.
The consumer goes to a retailer and decides to purchase specific
goods. The retailer then suggests that the consumer may want to
borrow the purchase price from a local financing agency. Varying
degrees of cooperation between the retailer and the financing agency
will effectuate the transaction. The consumer presumably will execute
a negotiable promissory note payable to the finance company, and
the finance company will give him a check payable to the retailer or to
the retailer and the consumer jointly. Perhaps, in accordance with an
agreement, the consumer will simultaneously grant the finance com-
pany a security interest in the goods purchased 22 Thus, the paper
work and legal obligations are nearly identical with type B, even
though the factual pattern begins as in type A.
As indicated earlier, judicial decisions have attempted to preserve
consumer defenses in transaction type A when there is a close con-
nection between the dealer and the finance agency. The Credit Code
suggests that the same result be reached by prohibiting the use of
negotiable instruments in consumer sales." But what about the con-
sumer loan as outlined in transaction type C? Is it not evident that
as far as the consumer is concerned, transactions type A and C are
identical? Any factual distinction lies only in paperwork. The con-
sumer has no more reason to expect that the obligation has been
separated from the retailer's performance in C than in A. It therefore
seems that the retention of the time-price differential in the Credit
Code will permit retailers and financing agencies to improve their
positions, relative to the consumer, by the appropriate paper shuffling.
Assuming that the above analysis sets forth the one possible
objection to the retention of the time-price-differential doctrine, the
question then becomes whether this problem can be resolved. It is
submitted that a frank recognition of the need to preserve consumer
defenses should be made. Section 6.102 of the First Draft (retained as
section 2.404 in the Second Draft) should be amended as follows:
Except as provided in section 6.101 [2.403 in Second
Draft], with respect to a consumer credit sale a transferee
22 U.C.C. §§ 9-108, -204 permit the creation and filing of a security interest to
take effect in the future. With prepared forms and standardized procedure, transaction
type C would present no practical problems in its execution. The resulting legal obliga-
tions would be substantially identical with those of transaction B.
23 Supra note 19. It is true that a holder in due course (taking free of defenses)
could be created when a retailer ignores the statutory prohibition against use of nego-
tiable instruments. It is submitted that this likelihood is rare enough so that it is
unnecessary to completely invalidate the negotiability of consumer paper.
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of the seller's rights or a lender subject to this Act who loans
money to the debtor knowing it will be used as the purchase
price of specific consumer goods is subject to all claims and
defenses of the debtor against the seller arising out of the
sale notwithstanding an agreement to the contrary. (Sug-
gested amendment in italics.)
Such an amendment is necessary to counteract the act's preservation of
the distinction between a consumer-credit sale and a consumer loan.
Without the amendment, the protection of the consumer's valid de-
fenses will be lost in certain transactions. They will be lost because the
Credit Code has chosen to preserve a dichotomy which has no function
or economic significance.
H. PARTIES COVERED
At the outset, it must be recognized that the coverage of consumer
legislation can be determined either by the character of the parties
or by the character of the transactions into which the parties enter.
Usually it is the latter which is controlling, but even when this is the
case, consideration should be given to the character of the parties. It
could be said, for example, that a retail installment sales act covers
retail buyers, but it is probably more fruitful to talk of a retail
transaction rather than a retail buyer.
No one suggests that a sophisticated business entity with sub-
stantial bargaining power needs protection from those who extend
it credit or loan it money. The legislator, however, is faced with the
problem of defining a class of persons to be protected by the act, and
may have to utilize a formula which either includes some parties not
needing protection or neglects some parties entitled to protection.
One obvious way of determining the scope of consumer-protec-
tion legislation is to make the act applicable to all transactions with
consumers. Very few acts, however, attempt to define "consumer."
It is possible to state the definition in terms of one who purchases for
"personal, family and household use," but this results, in effect, in
a definition dependent upon the subject matter of the transaction. It
would be difficult to define "consumer" in a way which would identify
objectively the individual with whom the creditor was dealing. The
characteristics of a consumer who needs protection from possible
abuses of certain segments of the credit industry are too nebulous. It
would require far too much legislative energy to define such attributes.
And after all, the creditor should not be put to the burden of investi-
gating whether a purchaser usually consumes personally what he
buys, or what his degree of economic literacy may be. Thus, the
24 See, e.g., U.C.C. § 9-109(1).
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drafters of consumer-credit legislation are well advised to find, in
some aspect of the transaction itself, a standard which will allow the
needed protection without overregulation.
Assuming that the nature of "consumer" presents an unattractive
criterion to determine the coverage of consumer-credit legislation, is
it advisable to include transactions with all but business entities?
Such coverage would arguably exclude corporations, partnerships,
and joint-stock companies. A number of factors, however, militate
against acceptance of this possibility. Individuals may incorporate for
tax purposes. Businessmen may buy for personal, household, and
family purposes using their business identity. Also, there seems little
reason for broadly denying protection to a class of consumers simply
because they are also businessmen.'
III TRANSACTIONS COVERED
A. Consumer Goods
Rejecting the distinction between retail and nonretail sales as
indeterminative,2° a legislative draftsman may attempt to focus upon
the purpose of the purchase 27 The Uniform Commercial Code in-
cludes a definition of "consumer goods" which does look to purpose:
Section 9-109(1) states that goods are consumer goods if "they are
used or bought for use primarily for personal, family or household
purposes." A number of states have adopted a definition similar to
this in their respective retail installment sales acts." The concept of
"consumer goods" has three principal advantages: (1) it focuses
upon the transaction; (2) it identifies the included subject matter
fairly reliably in the business world; and, (3) it probably applies to
most transactions where protection is needed. The definition, how-
ever, does suffer from a certain ambiguity, upon which some writers
have focused; 29
 but ambiguity is present in any definition.
A sales-financing act could conceivably apply to retail sales of
one or more particular kinds of goods, focusing on the goods them-
25 Report of Special Committee on Retail Installment Sales, Consumer Credit, Small
Loans and Usury to the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws
16 (1965).
26 Many acts termed "retail installment sales financing" acts seem to apply to
retail sales, but most of them include other limiting criteria. See, e.g., Ill. Ann. Stat.
ch. 121 § 223 (Smith-Hurd 1960) which states that "'retail installment sale' or 'sale'
means and includes any sale, other than for a commercial or business use . . . ."
27 Note the distinction between the purpose of a particular purchase and the
purpose of the buyer's purchases generally. The latter purpose would be a characteristic
of a buyer and not of a transaction. The reader is urged not to deduce any conceptualiza-
tion from the writer's use of a classification of subject matter into "parties covered" and
"transactions covered."
28 See, e.g., Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 42-83 (3)(b) (Supp. 1965); Mass. Gen.
Laws Ann. ch. 255D, § 1 (Supp. 1966).
20 See, e.g., Spivak, Secured Transactions 44-45 (3d ed. 1963).
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selves. Thus, it would be possible to have an act applying to auto-
mobiles, to hard goods (as defined), or soft goods (as defined). The
only time this type of coverage has been used is in the motor-vehicle-
financing acts prevalent in a number of states. It is submitted that the
limited coverage of these acts is justifiable only on the historical
basis of obtaining new legislation by degrees in areas where the
trouble is greatest. Any current proposals for consumer-protection
legislation should not make distinctions among types of goods.
Some consumer-protection acts cover all retail sales with certain
named exclusions, such as sales for "business or commercial pur-
poses!' The First Tentative Draft of the Credit Code was of this
type. In the definition of "consumer credit transaction," which
appeared in section 1.202, the draftsmen had decided to cover all
credit transaction?' with certain exceptions, rather than to specify
transactions for "personal, family, or household purposes." The
Second Draft, however, in section 2.102(1), explicitly accepted the
latter alternative. The formulation in the First Draft indicated a
policy decision that it is more appropriate to exclude transactions
obviously not needing protection than to risk a definition of included
transactions which might not apply to certain unforeseen circumstances
that ought to be covered. The drafters had favored overprotection as
opposed to underprotection. Considering the slight and harmless
consequences of overprotection, it is submitted that their original
decision was correct.
B. Amount of Credit Extended
There is at least arguably a reasonable relationship between the
amount of credit extended and the need for regulation. Presumably,
the larger the loan or credit, the more economically sophisticated the
borrower. The Russell Sage legislation, for example, designated, as
its sole criterion of coverage, loans not in excess of a certain sum of
money,32 and many retail sales financing acts now in force use
amount of credit extended as one of the criteria of coverage. 33
It is submitted that there is a contemporary concern which
supports the argument for a correlation between the amount of credit
granted and the protection necessary. Attention focused upon the
characteristics and habits of the poor in our society has not been
limited to traditional matters of welfare, education, and housing. It
30 E.g., Motor Vehicle Sales Act, Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 190.090 (1963). See I
CCH Instalment Credit Guide 1502-25 (1965).
31- "Credit transaction" is defined in § 1.201(11) of the First Draft as "a trans-
action (a) in which credit is granted in connection with (1) a loan, (2) a sale of goods
or services, or (3) an open-end lease of goods, or (b) in which debt is refinanced."
32 See note 4 supra.
33 See Curran, op. cit. supra note 2, at 353-55.
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has been shown that the purchasing, and especially credit-purchasing,
habits of the poor warrant particular attention. The poor often pay
more for credit, because they are both greater credit risks and more
naturally the prey of those who abuse the credit system. This does
not mean that consumer-protection legislation ought to be limited to
transactions involving an amount within the range of the indigent
borrower. It may well indicate, however, that the poor ought to have a
greater degree of protection than the average consumer purchaser.
Since circumstances make it unlikely that the poor will receive the
protection of the letter of the law, it may be advisable to provide
administrative control or supervision to a degree which would assure
them some measure of realistic protection. There are indications,
in Article 7 of the First Tentative Draft and Article 6 of the Second,
that the drafters are seriously considering advocation of a strong
administrative agency with jurisdiction over all consumer-credit trans-
actions. The policy decision as to the extent of the commissioner's
powers and the nature of his office has not yet been completely
formulated."
C. Secured Transactions
1. Personal-Property Security. One of the primary reasons for
consumer-credit regulation is certainly the prevention or amelioration
of abusive practices in personal-property security. No citation of
cases is needed when it is stated that the usual legal remedies avail-
able to a secured creditor—legal remedies designed for commercial
purposes—are much too harsh and unrealistic when applied to a
consumer's household furniture, appliances, or automobiles. The
earliest retail installment credit acts limited the secured lender's en-
forcement remedies." Is it meaningful to limit consumer-protection
legislation to transactions involving a security interest in personal
property? Such a limitation would deny rate and disclosure protection
to certain classes of credit consumers. While security is generally
required in consumer financing, there are many situations in which
the dealer and the financing agency will extend installment credit on
the good credit standing of the consumer. The creditor may be un-
concerned with security when the subject matter of the sale has little
resale value, when the value of the object is small compared to the
costs of perfecting a security interest, and when the transaction in-
volves such things as revolving credit.
34
 It is possible that in some states the administration of consumer-credit legis-
lation will be entrusted to an existing agency such as the Banking Commission. It is
submitted that this decision would significantly weaken the effectiveness of a credit
code patterned on the uniform version.
35 See, e.g., Ind. Laws 1935, ch. 231, §§ 8, 9.
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As a criterion, the presence of certain types of security may
serve to exclude the underlying commercial transactions. For example,
credit extended on the security of negotiable documents of title or
investment securities might indicate that the transaction need not be
covered by consumer-protection legislation.' It is doubtful, however,
whether the difficulty of defining such purely commercial security is
compensated for by valid distinctions in coverage which could not
be more easily obtained by a judicious use of other relevant criteria.
It is true that consumer-protection legislation ought to regulate the
use of security in connection with consumer-credit transactions, but
there seems no reason to limit the coverage to secured transactions.
2. Real-Property Security. One might suppose that installment
contracts secured by real property would not require the type of
regulation found in typical consumer-protection legislation. It is true
that the earliest retail installment sales acts were limited to personal
property or to goods and did not apply to real-estate sales. However,
the use of second mortgages as security for consumer loans, and the
phenomenon of retail installment consumer contracts for home-
improvement loans, evidence as much need for regulation as other
consumer loans.37 The wage earner who is persuaded to have aluminum
siding placed on his home on credit terms secured by a second
mortgage needs protection just as surely as an automobile buyer.
There is reason to suggest, however, that draftsmen would do
well to exclude the type of real-estate mortgages usually provided by
a bank or savings and loan association.' The possibility of enacting
proposed legislation over the articulate protests of the banking
industry would be slight. In addition, it would be unfortunate if the
banking procedures used in completing installment contracts for the
sale of homes required unnecessary changes.
A number of tests might be suggested to separate those trans-
actions which should be subject to regulation from those which
should not. Initially, it is submitted that it would be unwise to exempt
banks and savings and loan institutions from coverage of the act.
Banks do engage in many types of consumer-credit transactions, and
their share of typical consumer-credit business is continually in-
creasing." Likewise, it would perhaps be unwise to exempt only first
mortgages on real property. There is not that much functional differ-
ence between the use of the first mortgage and the use of the second
36 See Special Committee Report, supra note 25, at 17.
37 See, e.g., New Jersey Mortgage & Inv. Corp. v. Calvetti, 68 N.J. Super. 18, 171
A.2d 321 (1961); Davis v. Commercial Credit Corp., 87 Ohio App. 311, 94 N.E.2d
710 (1950).
a8 See generally Prather, Economics, Morality and the Real-Estate Loan, p. 475 infra.
39 See Developments in Consumer Credit, 52 Fed. Reserve Bull. 768, 777-80 (1966).
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mortgage. Also, banks do use second mortgages for commercial as
well as for consumer purposes.
A recent New Jersey statute" regulating loans secured by second
mortgages applies to any
loan made to an individual or partnership not to be repaid in
90 days or less which is secured in whole or in part by a
mortgage upon any interest in real property used as a
dwelling with accommodations for not more than 4 families,
which property is subject to the lien of one or more prior
mortgages. . . .41
Banking institutions are excluded from the act,' and second
mortgages are required to be licensed.'" The New Jersey act suffi-
ciently excludes commercial second mortgages by limiting coverage
to individual or partnership debtors, by limiting coverage to second
mortgages on dwellings, and by excluding banks.
IV. CONCLUSIONS
The Second Tentative Draft of the Uniform Consumer Credit
Code is likely to undergo some changes before a promulgated version
is available. However, the draftsmen are not likely to make significant
changes regarding coverage. Special groups will undoubtedly attempt
to win exclusionary provisions, but any such provisions should not
affect the overall coverage of the act.
This article has attempted to pinpoint some rather obvious
considerations regarding coverage of consumer-credit legislation. A
few main conclusions might be restated here for the earnest con-
sideration of any draftsman.
(1) Care ought to be exercised so that the proposed retention,
in legislative form, of the time-price differential does not have un-
foreseen ramifications which could hamper the basic purposes of
consumer-protection legislation.
(2) Coverage of consumer-protection legislation is better de-
signed when it focuses upon excluding certain transactions obviously
not needing protection, rather than attempting to define coverage by
identifying those specific transactions which, for the moment, appar-
ently need protection.
(3) Coverage of consumer-protection legislation can best be
structured by using a number of relevant criteria, rather than
attempting use of a broad general category, either of parties or of
transactions.
40 Secondary Mortgage Loan Business Law, N.J. Stat. Ann. §§ 17:11A-1 to -33
(Supp. 1966).
41 N.J. Stat. Ann. § 17:11A-la(1) (Supp. 1966).
42 N.J. Stat. Ann. § 17:11A-lb (Supp. 1966).
43 N.J. Stat. Ann. § 17:11A-2 (Supp. 1966).
474
